Wolfe v. City of Pittsburgh by unknown
1998 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
3-25-1998 
Wolfe v. City of Pittsburgh 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1998 
Recommended Citation 
"Wolfe v. City of Pittsburgh" (1998). 1998 Decisions. 58. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1998/58 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 1998 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
Filed March 25, 1998 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 




JUNE M. WOLFE; JOSEPH J. CAMPISI; PAUL R. RENK; 
STEVEN R. GARDNER; GEORGE T. TROSKY; 
MICHAEL F. BROWN; GEORGETTE A. SCAFEDE; 




CITY OF PITTSBURGH 
 
George Trosky, Michael Brown and Paul Renk, 
       Appellants 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 95-cv-00664) 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 16, 1998 
 
Before: SLOVITER, RENDELL and SEITZ, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: March 25, 1998) 
 
       Thomas H. Ayoob, III 
       Pittsburgh, PA 15222 
 
       Michael L. Rosenfield 
       Pittsburgh, PA 15219 
 




       Diego Correa 
       Jacqueline R. Morrow 
       City of Pittsburgh 
       Department of Law 
       Pittsburgh, PA 15219 
 
        Counsel for Appellee 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
 
Appellants George Trosky, Michael Brown, and Paul 
Renk, white male police officers, filed this action under 42 
U.S.C. S 1983, 42 U.S.C. S 1981, Title VII, and Pennsylvania 
state law alleging that the City of Pittsburgh discriminated 
against them on the basis of their race when it failed to 
promote them to the rank of lieutenant. Appellant officers 
argue that the 1979 federal court order setting a quota for 
minority hiring had expired before the promotions were 
made, therefore exposing the City to liability. The officers 
filed a motion for summary judgment but instead the 
district court granted summary judgment on behalf of the 
City. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 1291. Our 




This case arises from a history of discriminatory practices 
in the hiring and promotion of minority officers in the City 
of Pittsburgh police department which spawned extensive 
litigation dating back to 1975, and which generated at least 
six published decisions regarding the appropriate remedies 
and other related issues. In 1975, Chief Judge Weber,1 the 
district judge originally presiding over the case, found that 
the City's hiring procedures involved a pattern and practice 
of racial and sexual discrimination; as a remedy, the court 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Although we do not ordinarily trace the history of a case in terms of 
the district judge by name, in this case three district judges have 
presided over different phases of the litigation and the identity of the 
judge who signed each order is relevant. 
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imposed a "temporary interim preferential hiring quota" 
whereby appointments would be made from qualified lists 
in groups of four as follows: one white male, one white 
female, one black male, and one black female. 
Commonwealth v. Flaherty, 404 F. Supp. 1022, 1030-31 
(W.D. Pa. 1975). Although that order, by its terms, appears 
to have applied only to hiring, the City thereafter filed a 
request with the court to authorize it to promote 18 
lieutenants and 24 sergeants "straight down" the eligibility 
list without regard to race or gender. The Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania, the NAACP and the Guardians of Greater 
Pittsburgh (on behalf of black policemen) opposed the City's 
proposal because it would perpetuate the racial imbalance. 
 
Judge Weber denied the City's request to promote 
"straight down" but, citing the pressing need of the City to 
fill vacancies, ruled on October 12, 1979, that: 
 
       We will allow the defendants, however, to promote up 
       to 18 individuals to the rank of lieutenant and up to 28 
       to the rank of sergeant with the mandate that one of 
       each six promoted to either rank must be minority 
       members otherwise qualified. 
 
       We do not command how this shall be done. The 
       officers of the City of Pittsburgh have as great a duty 
       to follow the mandates of the Constitution as does this 
       court. During all the progress of this lawsuit we have 
       found very little evidence of an active effort by the City 
       to solve the problems of race and sex discrimination by 
       action on its own rather than relying entirely on the 
       mandate of this court at every step. There is a pool of 
       eligible candidates for both grades containing minority 
       members who have at least demonstrated some 
       capacity by scoring a passing grade on the 
       examinations, and by prior satisfactory service as 
       patrolman and in some cases as sergeants. Because 
       the pool of eligible candidates for lieutenant contain 
       minority members, some of whom have experience as 
       sergeants, and because the eligibility list for sergeants 
       contain qualified minority members, such selection can 
       be made within the statutory scheme. 
 
Commonwealth v. Flaherty, 477 F. Supp. 1263, 1266-67 
(W.D. Pa. 1979) (emphasis added). With respect to the 
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duration of his "mandate that one of each six promoted to 
either rank must be minority members otherwise qualified," 
Judge Weber stated only: 
 
       Because the present promotional list is of limited 
       duration, and will expire within the coming year, the 
       problem may be ameliorated in future years because of 
       the eligibility of minority members and women newly 
       hired as police officers under our prior order. The 
       effects of the prior discriminatory practices will be 
       lessened in the future. 
 
Id. at 1267. 
 
Almost immediately the question arose whether a 
Hispanic officer was a "minority" under the October 12, 
1979 order, and on December 19, 1979, Judge Weber 
issued a temporary restraining order preventing the City 
from promoting a Hispanic officer under the aegis of the 
October 12, 1979 order, clarifying that the term"minority" 
as used in the October order referred to black officers, not 
Hispanic officers. App. at 10-11. On January 9, 1980, 
Judge Weber made the temporary restraining order issued 
December 19, 1979 permanent, stating that "[t]he City of 
Pittsburgh is ordered and directed to proceed under the 
order of this court of October 12, 1979, and in making 
such promotions as were allowed therein it shall promote 
one black police officer of the plaintiff class of each six 
officers so promoted." App. at 12. See also Commonwealth 
v. Flaherty, 482 F. Supp. 305, 307 (W.D. Pa. 1980). 
 
Sometime thereafter, the City filed a motion for 
"Modification of Court Opinion and Order." It sought to 
make three promotions to lieutenant and six promotions to 
sergeant and asked, in essence, if promoting one minority 
to each position was "in accordance with the program of 
racial balance pursuant to this Court's order." App. at 13- 
14. On October 6, 1980, Judge Weber permitted the 
proposed promotions "in accordance with the mandates of 
the Court Order of October 12, 1979." App. at 15. 
 
In addition to the racial discrimination that was the 
subject of the orders in question, the City was the subject 
of allegations of gender discrimination in hiring. Judge 
Weber conducted a nonjury trial on this claim and awarded 
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judgment and back pay to plaintiffs. See Commonwealth v. 
Flaherty, 532 F. Supp. 106 (W.D. Pa. 1982); Commonwealth 
v. Flaherty, 547 F. Supp. 172 (W.D. Pa. 1982). 
 
In 1984, the Fraternal Order of Police, on behalf of white 
male officers who claimed they were passed over for 
promotion in favor of minority officers, moved to "terminate" 
the October 12, 1979 order which, according to the motion 
itself, "imposed, in part, a program of preferential 
affirmative promotions to the ranks of sergeant and 
lieutenant. . . ." App. at 17-18. Judge Weber denied the 
motion on January 25, 1984, stating merely: "The grounds 
of the present motion were considered at the time the 
original order was entered and rejected." App. at 18. On 
appeal, this Court affirmed the order "without prejudice to 
presentation of a proper petition alleging changed 
circumstances and/or law." See App. at 24. 
 
The F.O.P. filed another challenge later that year to the 
one-in-four minority hiring quota scheme imposed in 1975. 
On August 30, 1984 Judge Weber denied the F.O.P.'s 
petition, but in the course of his memorandum order 
referred to his October 12, 1979 order as having "imposed 
a program of preferential affirmative promotions applicable 
to the ranks of sergeant and lieutenant in the Pittsburgh 
Department of Police." App. at 23. 
 
Seven years later, in 1991, white candidates for police 
officer challenged the 1975 one-in-four hiring quota system. 
The matter came before then Chief Judge Cohill, who now 
presided. Judge Cohill dissolved the hiring quota, but in 
doing so noted the distinct orders covering hiring and 
promotion within the police department and stated, inter 
alia: 
 
       We note that in the earlier years of the preliminary 
       injunction's operation, Judge Weber addressed the 
       issue of promotion of women and minorities and 
       entered appropriate remedial orders. As Judge Weber 
       did, we view the preliminary injunction [re hiring] as 
       separate from the issue of promotions. Thus, our 
       Opinion today has no effect on these earlier orders. 
       Likewise, we view these findings of discrimination in 
       promotion as unrelated to our consideration of the 
       preliminary injunction. 
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Commonwealth v. Flaherty, 760 F. Supp. 472, 480 (W.D. 
Pa. 1991) (citations omitted). The Commonwealth 
subsequently appealed from the dissolution of the 
preliminary injunction, but this court upheld the 
dissolution of the 1975 hiring quota. Commonwealth v. 
Flaherty, 983 F.2d 1267 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 
It was not until 1993 that the NAACP and the Guardians 
of Greater Pittsburgh, co-plaintiffs in the original actions, 
sought action with respect to the court order regarding 
promotions. Noting the progress made by the City and an 
agreement the parties had reached, the plaintiffsfiled a 
formal motion to "dissolve the order of October 12, 1979." 
In a one-sentence order dated December 15, 1993 Judge 
Cohill dissolved the order of October 12, 1979. App. at 43. 
The following year, we reversed the district court's award of 
attorneys' fees to intervening white police officers against 
the Commonwealth in the hiring case. Commonwealth v. 




With this history in mind, we turn to this appeal by the 
plaintiff officers of the district court's grant of summary 
judgment for the City. The basis for the officers' S 1983 suit 
against the City is their contention that the October 12, 
1979 order entered by Judge Weber had automatically 
dissolved in 1980 and thus was not in effect in April 1993 
when they were bypassed for promotion in favor of minority 
officers. Therefore, although they do not expressly so argue, 
we infer they are arguing that more recent decisions 
restricting race-based promotions apply here. 
 
Judge Smith, the district judge to whom this latest case 
was assigned, rejected that argument, holding that the 
October 12, 1979 order was in effect until its dissolution by 
Judge Cohill on December 15, 1993, and that the City is 
shielded from liability when acting pursuant to a court 
order. Judge Smith also held that the City did not have a 
duty to challenge the order following changes in the law, a 
contention plaintiffs apparently made in the district court 
that they do not repeat here. Finally, Judge Smith held that 
the promotions made in April 1993, before the dissolution, 
were consistent with the then-effective 1979 mandate. 
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The history of this case set forth above shows that the 
parties operated in the apparent belief that there were 
parallel orders: one entered in 1975 covering hiring and one 
entered in 1979 covering promotions. Although the status 
of the October 12, 1979 order was not without ambiguity in 
the years thereafter, there is ample support for Judge 
Smith's holding that the order was in effect until dissolved 
in 1993. Foremost is the subsequent ruling by Judge Weber 
himself in 1984 denying the F.O.P.'s request to dissolve the 
1979 quota system mandated by the October 12, 1979 
order. Indeed, if Judge Weber regarded the order as having 
expired in 1980, it is unlikely he would have entertained a 
motion for its dissolution on the merits. 
 
Moreover, there is the inescapable fact that there was no 
judicial action on the docket regarding the October 12, 
1979 order until Judge Cohill dissolved it on December 15, 
1993, after the promotions in question. Although plaintiff 
officers dismiss the 1993 dissolution as mere 
"housekeeping," that is not persuasive in light of the fact 
that Judge Cohill had earlier dissolved the parallel 1975 
order dealing with hiring in 1991 and expressly stated that 
the dissolution of the 1975 injunction had "no effect" on the 
promotions quota system. Commonwealth v. Flaherty, 760 
F. Supp. at 480 (citations omitted). 
 
In reviewing the history of the injunction governing hiring 
in 1993, we commented that "[t]his case is unusual 
because the preliminary injunction remained in effect for 
more than fifteen years, during which time no party sought 
to pursue the action on the merits or to dispose of the issue 
of permanent injunctive relief." Commonwealth v. Flaherty, 
983 F.2d at 1269. A similar comment could be made 
regarding the injunction governing promotions. Although it 
may have initially served as a preliminary injunction, in 
time and with judicial rejection of efforts to dissolve it the 
October 12, 1979 order became effectively a permanent 
injunction and the parties and the courts so treated it. 
 
While the 1979 order did not affirmatively direct the City 
to promote officers, it did conditionally mandate that if the 
City effectuated such promotions, they were to be made in 
conformity with that order. The Policemen's Civil Service 
statute, however, obligated the City to address promotions. 
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53 Pa. Stat. Ann. S 23535 ("Vacancies in positions in the 
competitive class shall be filled by promotions from among 
persons holding positions in a lower grade in the bureau of 
police.") (emphasis added). Thus, it is clear that the City 
faced but one real course -- a Hobson's choice-- to follow 
the court's order. As such, the City has not deliberately 
adopted an "official policy," other than to follow the law, 
that would give rise to section 1983 liability. See Pembaur 
v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483 (1986); cf. Lockhart 
v. Hoenstine, 411 F.2d 455, 460 (3d Cir. 1969) ("[A]ny 
public official acting pursuant to court directive is [ ] 
immune from suit"); Turney v. O'Toole, 898 F.2d 1470, 
1472-73 (10th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted) ("officials 
charged with the duty of executing a facially valid court 
order enjoy absolute immunity from liability for damages in 
a suit challenging conduct prescribed in that order.. . . 
`Facially valid' does not mean `lawful.' An erroneous order 
can be valid."). 
 
In light of our agreement with Judge Smith that the 1979 
order was effective in 1993, we see no more basis to impose 
liability upon the City for the 1993 promotions than there 
would have been to impose liability upon it for the 1979 
promotions. There is nothing in the record to suggest that 
in making the 1993 promotions the City acted other than in 
the belief that the 1979 court order continued to apply. Not 
until Judge Cohill's order of December 15, 1993 was this 
litigious episode in the history of the City of Pittsburgh 
finally put to rest. 
 
We see no error by the district court in its application of 
the relevant legal principles, and we will affirm the grant of 
summary judgment. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
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